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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) NO. 41355 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) BONNEVILLE COUNTY NO. CR 2012-1608·1 
V. ) 
) 
JOSHUA THOMAS BENNETT, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
________ ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Joshua Thomas Bennett asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of 
the Idaho Court of Appeals, 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 388 (Ct. App. March 3, 
2015) (hereinafter, Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed his Judgment 
of Conviction, is not in accord with applicable decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court and Idaho Supreme Court. 
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FILED-C Y 
APR 2 0 2015 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Following a jury trial at which the chief witness against him was Levi Sermon, a 
confidential informant, Mr. Bennett was found guilty of delivery of a controlled substance 
(marijuana). (See generally Trs.) During cross-examination of Mr. Sermon, defense 
counsel attempted to ask Mr. Sermon about his prior activities as a cocaine dealer, but 
the district court sustained the State's relevance objection. (Tr. (Vol. 11), p.13, L.17 -
p.15, L.17.) This was despite the fact that, on direct examination, Mr. Sermon had 
testified regarding his past as a cocaine dealer, and claimed that making amends for his 
past work as a drug dealer was the main reason why he began working as an informant. 
(Tr. (Vol. I), p.222, Ls.10-16.) 
Mr. Bennett received a unified sentence of five years, with two-and-one-half 
years fixed (R., pp.131-32), and filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., p.140.) On appeal, 
Mr. Bennett argued that the district court erred, and violated his Sixth Amendment right 
to confront his accuser, when it sustained the State's relevance objection during his 
attempt to cross-examine the State's key witness regarding a matter testified to on 
direct examination that concerned the witness' bias, interest, or motive. (Opinion, p.1.) 
The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Bennett's conviction and sentence, finding that 
any error committed by the district court was harmless. (Opinion, pp.4-6.) Mr. Bennett 
filed a timely Notice of Appeal. 
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ISSUE 
Is the Idaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming Mr. Bennett's Judgment of Conviction 
not in accord with applicable decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Supreme Court? 
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ARGUMENT 
The Idaho Court Of A eals' 0 inion Affirmin Mr. Bennett's Jud ment Of Conviction Is 
Not In Accord With Ap licable Decisions Of The United States Supreme Court And The 
Idaho Supreme Court 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, Mr. Bennett argued that he should have been permitted to cross-
examine the State's confidential informant regarding that informant's prior activities as a 
cocaine dealer. The Court of Appeals determined that any error committed by the 
district court was harmless. Mr. Bennett asserts that the deprivation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront his accuser affected the outcome of his case and therefore 
could not have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Or inion Affirming Mr. Bennett's Judgment Of 
Conviction ls Not Likely In Accord With Applicable Decisions Of The United 
States Supreme Court And The Idaho Supreme Court 
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be granted only 
"when there are special and important reasons" for doing so, but, ultimately, the 
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the 
Supreme Court. I.A.R. 118(b). This exercise of discretion is not completely unfettered 
though. Rule 118(b) lists five factors which must serve as the starting point in 
evaluating any petition for review: 
1) Whether the Court of Appeals has decided an issue of first impression; 
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from 
the Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court; 
3) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior 
decisions; 
4) Whether the Court of Appeals' actions are so unusual as to call for the 
Supreme Courts' exercise of its supervisory authority; and 
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5) Whether a majority of the Court of Appeals has certified that further 
appellate review is desirable. 
I.AR. 118(b). 
As set forth below, the Court of Appeals' Opinion in this case is not in accord with 
applicable decisions of the United States Supreme Court because Mr. Bennett's Sixth 
Amendment right to cross examine the State's confidential informant was curtailed. See 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974). Additionally, the Court of Appeals 
incorrectly determined that the deprivation of this right was harmless. State v. Sheldon, 
145 Idaho 225, 230, 178 P.3d 28, 33 (2008) ("To hold an error harmless, this Court 
must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable 
possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.") 
C. Thi~ Court Should Grants Mr. Bennett's Petition For Review, Because The 
District Court Erred, And Violated Mr. Bennett's Sixth Amendment Right To 
Confront His Accuser, When It Sustained The State's Relevance Objection 
During His Attempt To Cross-Examine The Confidential Informant Regarding 
Matters Testified To On Direct Examination And That Concerned His Bias, 
Interest, Or Motive 
1. Relevant Factual Background 
At trial, after establishing that confidential informant Levi Sermon was being paid 
$200 to $300 for each controlled buy he completed for police (Tr. (Vol. II), p.13, Ls.4-
16), 1 defense counsel attempted to cross-examine him regarding his past as a drug 
dealer, as follows: 
Q. How many times did you sell cocaine? 
[Prosecutor:] Your Honor, I'm going to object. That's not relevant to this 
particular inquiry. 
1 He had previously worked as an informant to avoid a conviction for selling cocaine. 
(Tr. (Vol. II), p.11, L.11-p.12, L.2.) 
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[Defense counsel:] I believe it is, Your Honor. They raised fl yesterday -
his past, his drug dealing. I think we're entitled to go into it because it 
affects his credibility. 
[Prosecutor:] His prior conduct years ago does not affect his credibility on 
the issues of this date. The number of times he may have engaged in a 
felony itself does not affect his credibility on this date. 
[Defense counsel:] We've talked about it already. She brought it up 
yesterday, and I'm following up today. And he - without any objection, he 
started he talked about selling cocaine. That was what his prior felony 
was. So I'm asking him how many times he did it. 
THE COURT: I don't know how long ago we're talking about. 
Because it may not be relevant at this point. 
[Defense counsel:] All right. I guess I could ... 
THE COURT: I mean, was it more recent than I think you need to 
lay some kind of foundation. 
[Defense counsel:] Okay. Thank you. 
Q. After your bust for cocaine delivery, did you sell cocaine after that 
point? 
A. No. 
Q. But you did before that point? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. How long before that point? 
THE COURT: Okay. I don't know when he was busted for -
Q. When were you busted for cocaine sales? 
A. I believe it was 2009. 
Q. Okay. 
[Prosecutor:] Your Honor, I'm going to object to any further inquiry. He 
hasn't been convicted of that. I allowed some of it because I felt it was 
relevant to the cooperation agreement and why he was working in the first 
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place. But going into specific instances is completely inappropriate, and 
it's not a conviction. So I'm going to object to any further inquiry into this. 
[Defense counsel:] Your Honor 
THE COURT: It was four years ago. 
[Defense counsel:] Yes. But we're establishing what this gentleman's 
knowledge of his drug trade is. He's the one that mentioned it yesterday. 
THE COURT: 
sufficiently. 
I'll sustain the objection. I think it's been argued 
[Defense counsel:] Okay. 
(Tr. (Vol. II), p.13, L.17-p.15, L.17 (emphases added).) 
During the State's direct examination of Mr. Sermon, it had inquired as to why he 
"start[ed] working [as an informant] for the sheriff's office in the first place," to which he 
responded, 
I used to be a drug dealer. All I could think about every night was how 
many kids' lives I'd ruined, how many mamas' babies is out doing drugs 
because of me. I feel like I'm giving back and doing something that's right. 
No mom or parent should have to see that. 
(Tr. (Vol. I), p.222, Ls.10-16.) 
Because l.R.E. 611 (b) provides that "[c]ross-examination should be limited to the 
subject matter of direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness," 
and because the answer sought was relevant to the confidential informant's motivation 
to testify, the district court abused its discretion when it sustained the State's relevance 
objection to his attempt to cross-examine the confidential informant regarding matters 
he testified to on direct examination, namely his motivation for acting as an informant.2 
2 Because this issue is non-constitutional, Mr. Bennett will discuss it first. See State v. 
Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 6 (2010) (W. Jones, J., concurring) ("It is a fundamental principle of 
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Additionally, the district court's decision to sustain the State's objection deprived 
Mr. Bennett of his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. 
2. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sustained The State's 
Relevance Objection 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
I.R.E. 401. The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained, "The credibility of a witness is 
always material." State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 38 (Ct. App. 1988). Quoting the United 
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the similar federal rule of evidence, the Court 
of Appeals has explained that evidence that bears on credibility is relevant, and that 
'"[b]ias may be induced by a witness' ... self-interest.' Generally, 'Proof of bias is 
almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has 
historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and 
truth of a witness' testimony."' State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 540 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984)) (citations omitted). 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 611 (b ), in relevant part, provides, "Cross-examination 
should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting 
the credibility of the witness." I.R.E. 611 (b). The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained, 
"The appropriate scope of cross-examination includes not only the facts testified to on 
direct examination, but other facts connected with those facts, directly or indirectly, 
tending to explain, modify, or qualify the inferences resulting from the direct 
our jurisprudence that courts pass on deciding constitutional issues if the case can be 
decided without addressing the constitutional question.") (citations omitted). 
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examination." State v. Brummett, ·150 Idaho 339, 344 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. 
Starry, 96 Idaho 148, 150 (1974)). 
Defense counsel was attempting to cross-examine Mr. Sermon about a matter he 
testified to on direct examination - his motivation for acting as an informant - and about 
a matter that went directly to his bias, interest, and motive in acting as a confidential 
informant and testifying for the State. Both bases for the subject on which defense 
counsel sought to cross-examine Mr. Sermon were appropriate areas of inquiry under 
1.R.E. 401 and 611 (b). As such, the district court abused its discretion when it failed to 
recognize both the relevance of the questioning and the fact that it was an area to which 
cross-examination "should be limited" under I.R.E. 611 (b). 
3. Mr. Bennett's Sixth Amendment Right To Confront His Accuser Was 
Violated When The District Court Sustained The State's Relevance 
Objection 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in relevant part, 
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
The United States Supreme Court has explained the significance of the Sixth 
Amendment right to cross-examine the government's witnesses as follows: 
Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a 
witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Subject always to the 
broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly 
harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve 
into the witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but the 
cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, 
the witness. . . . A more particular attack on the witness' credibility is 
effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing 
possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may 
relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The partiality 
of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is "always relevant as 
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discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony." We 
have recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is 
a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of 
cross-examination. 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 3·16-17 (1974) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). The Idaho Supreme Court has explained, "This court has consistently held that 
where a defendant is seeking on cross-examination to show bias or test the credibility of 
the complaining witness, the trial court should allow considerable latitude." State v. 
White, 97 Idaho 708, 713 (1976) (citing State v. Storms, 84 Idaho 372, 375-76 (1962)). 
Mr. Bennett's thwarted attempt to cross-examine Mr. Sermon regarding his 
testimony on direct examination, which also concerned his bias, interest, or motive in 
acting as a confidential informant and testifying against Mr. Bennett, violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront his accuser. In preventing Mr. Bennett from cross-
examining on the issue, the district court failed to recognize what the United States 
Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have recognized: that the trial court 
should give "considerable latitude" to defense counsel and that "exposure of a witness' 
motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally 
protected right of cross-examination." 
4. The Error Cannot Be Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
Idaho Criminal Rule (I.C.R.) 52 mandates that "any error ... which does not affect 
substantial rights shall be disregarded." 'To hold an error harmless, this Court must 
declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility 
that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction." State v. Sheldon, 145 
Idaho 225, 230, 178 P.3d 28, 33 (2008). Here, the defense was prevented from eliciting 
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testimony from the confidential informant that went directly to the informant's bias, 
interest, and motive in acting in this case. Credibility is always relevant and necessary 
for a jury's determination of guilt in a criminal case. Here, although there was an audio 
recording of the purported transactions, the confidential informant was the only person 
physically present during the transactions and therefore, permitting the jury to hear 
evidence of the informant's suspect credibility was of utmost importance. Accordingly, 
the district court's error in failing to allow defense counsel to delve into the confidential 
informant's prior history as a drug dealer cannot be harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bennett respectfully requests that this Court grant his Petition for Review. If 
granted, Mr. Bennett requests that this Court vacate the judgment of conviction, and 
remand this matter to the district court for a new trial at which he is allowed to conduct 
adequate cross-examination of the State's chief witness against him. 
DATED this 20th day of April, 2015. 
L~-c V--- ~~ 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
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